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Who Can’t Raise Capital?:
The Scylla and Charybdis of Capital Formation
James D. Cox1
Fifty years ago, the worst one could be called was a communist. Today, it likely is not flattering to be so referred to, but worse yet to be called a 
regulator. Regulators are found at all levels of government; one of the missions 
of government is, after all, to regulate for the greater good. But because opinions 
vary widely on just what is the “good” that is to be served, there is the Newtonian 
effect whereby each regulatory initiative produces an equal and opposite claim 
that harm, not good, is the end product of the regulator’s initiative. So it has 
been for several decades with the arcane, but economically significant, area of 
securities regulations. 
One can say with some credibility that securities transactions are among 
the most highly regulated in the economy. Not only do state and federal 
regulation of securities transactions coexist but also market intermediaries 
are further regulated by well–armed self–regulatory organizations. While the 
regulatory bodies share the common goal of investor protection, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission also has among its stated objectives the promotion 
of capital formation.2 Thus, it finds itself frequently faced with the conflicting 
tugs of investor needs and calls for less friction on capital formation and the 
operation of securities markets.3 And, most significantly, Congress has in 
recent years been attuned to the needs of business as the nation competes in 
an increasingly globalized marketplace. That is, today regulatory initiatives 
for securities markets occur within the red–hot crucible heated by growing 
concern that regulation increases capital costs for domestic firms and thereby 
places them at a profound disadvantage in an increasingly competitive global 
economy.4 
But just where is the state regulator to be placed in this global economy? 
State blue sky laws long preceded the U.S. securities laws. Federal regulation 
1 Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The author is grateful for the research 
assistance provided by Messrs. Robert Blaney and Alex Dominey.
2 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) (mandating that in adopting rules 
the SEC consider, in addition to investor protection, “whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation”). 
3 Luigi Zingales et al., Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation 67 (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_
Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
4 See, e.g., id. at 59 (emphasizing the decline in capital formation that occurs in U.S. markets 
due to an inhospitable regulatory environment).
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was seen as necessary because of weaknesses in the state laws. Hence, the 
Securities Act of 1933 treated state and federal regulation of securities offerings 
as complementary, and they so operated for sixty years. The state regulation 
was hardly the mirror image of federal regulation. Whereas much of the U.S. 
securities laws are focused on disclosure, most state blue sky laws embraced both 
disclosure and merit review as ways to protect state investors.5 Armed with a 
statutory license to consider whether the offering was too risky or otherwise bore 
signs of opportunistic behavior by insiders, the states implemented disclosure 
and merit evaluation regulations, introducing levels of review unparalleled in 
the federal disclosure–only process. 
A dramatic collision of state regulation and Congress’s preference for 
capital formation occurred with the enactment of the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996;6 the legislation would have occurred 
earlier had globalization been a concern earlier.7 A central feature of NSMIA 
is the preemption of state authority to regulate certain offerings of securities.8 
NSMIA’s preemption of state authority embodied negative views that ranged 
from the belief that state regulation was unnecessary in light of protections 
involved with the offering complying with federal standards to the highly 
negative view that state regulation was not only burdensome but also arbitrary.9
I. The Stratification of U.S. Markets
Much of the federal securities law is built upon the distinctions that separate 
investors into groups. Indeed, Table 1 reflects an important reality regarding 
capital formulation in the United States: most capital is not raised via offerings 
registered with the SEC, but instead through one of many exemptions, each of 
which is largely premised on various investor qualities that are specified in the 
exemption.10
5 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report on the Uniformity of State Regulatory 
Requirements for Offerings of Securities that Are Not “Covered Securities” (Oct. 
11, 1997) [hereinafter SEC Uniformity Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
uniformy.htm (reporting that about forty states undertake some form of merit review as part of 
their permitting of offerings within their state).
6 National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA), Pub. L. No. 104–290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
7 See generally Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 151, 166 (2010) (detailing the legislative history of the NSMIA). 
8 Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2012).
9 See SEC Uniformity Report, supra note 5.
10 See Vladimir Ivanov & Scott Bauguess, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis 
of Unregistered Offerings Using the Regulation D Exemption, 2009–2012, at 9 ( July 
2013) [hereinafter Ivanov & Bauguess Study], available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/
whitepapers/dera–unregistered–offerings–reg–d.pdf (reporting that, based on the data supporting 
Figure 4, registered offerings (debt and equity) in 2012 totaled $1.2 trillion, whereas capital raised 
solely through the Rule 506 exemption was $898 billion; adding in other exempt offerings boosts 
the total sum raised through exemptions considerably above $1.2 trillion); see also Eliminating the 
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not vice versa).16 The overall rationale for little paternalism being accorded 
QIBs and accredited investors stems from the belief that they each possess 
endowments—wealth, experience, and intelligence—likely to enable them to 
self–protect against opportunistic behavior. 
Demonstrated wealth, experience, and intelligence also characterize a third 
market for offerings: those affected by the authority of Section 4(a)(2)’s private 
offering exemption.17 Whereas both Rule 144A and the accredited investor 
are based solely on objectively verifiable criteria, the “sophisticated investor” 
criteria that underlies Section 4(a)(2) is not solely based on inputs that are so 
verifiable.18 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the exemption 
interjected an information component that is not a prerequisite for either 
Rule 144A offerings or those made solely to accredited investors.19 As seen in 
Table 1, Section 4(a)(2) offerings (even augmented by offshore offerings made 
under Regulation S) are miniscule compared to Rule 144A offerings.20 Table 
1 however, understates the significance of Section 4(a)(2) since Regulation D 
offerings include a substantial number of investors who fall within 
Section 4(a)(2); indeed, ninety–nine percent of Regulation D offerings are 
pursuant to SEC Rule 506,  the safe harbor for Section 4(a)(2).21
The residual, the great unwashed, category of investors are rightly seen 
as those having the greatest need for paternalism. They lack either objective 
or subjective qualities that suggest they can “fend for themselves.”22 Because 
of a decision made years ago that issuers, not investors, would be regulated, 
public resources are now devoted to the protection of this group of investors.23 
16 The SEC recently estimated that at least 8.7 million households, or about 7.4% of all 
U.S. households, qualified as accredited investors in 2010. SEC Eliminating Advertising Release, 
Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,793 ( July 
24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239 & 242) (citing Survey of Consumer Finances: Survey 
Data, Bd. Governors Fed. Res. Sys., available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/
scf_2010survey.htm (last updated Apr. 16, 2013)).
17 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012) (“[T]he provisions of section 77e of 
this title shall not apply to . . . transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering.”).
18 Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Act 
does not speak in terms of ‘sophisticated’ as opposed to ‘unsophisticated’ people dealing in securities. 
The rules when the giants play are the same as when the pygmies enter the market.”). 
19 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953). Although Justice Clark’s opinion 
never expressly refers to sophistication, later decisions have held, with some uniformity, that 
Clark’s formulation that the exemption exists for those who can “fend for themselves” necessarily 
meant that each offeree had, by experience or education, financial sophistication. See James D. 
Cox, Robert W. Hillman & Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases and 
Materials 267–71 (7th ed. 2013).
20 Ivanov & Bauguess Study, supra note 9, at 9. 
21 Id. at 7, 9.
22 This glib expression flows from Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124–25, and embodies the 
overall philosophy of the private offering exemption.
23 Professor Choi developed an intriguing model to show how markets might be segmented 
according to investor quality. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market–Based 
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Regulation has, until recently, greatly limited this group of investors’ access to 
new offerings. The irony of this regulatory choice is that investors who fall into 
this group are permitted to purchase, with abandon, securities sold on public 
markets, including the unregulated Pink Sheet Market where issuers that do 
not comply with SEC reporting requirements trade. They are not, however, 
permitted to acquire unregistered securities offered by the issuer. Thus, their 
protection depends not on what they purchase, but the medium with which 
they pursue the investment.
The duplicity with which the federal securities laws treat unsophisticated, 
non–accredited investors was not lost on Congress. Among the justifications 
for the crowdfunding provision24 that Congress enacted with the JOBS Act of 
201225 was the egalitarian belief that opportunities to invest in the next Apple 
should not be limited to QIBs and accredited investors. It is perhaps more 
soundly argued that regulation should somehow complement the reality that 
most small venture entrepreneurs know few—if any—sophisticated, accredited, 
or QIB investors so that an exemption in addition to this elite group is 
necessary. That is, regulation premised on the above categories forecloses the 
budding entrepreneur from sources of capital that would be the most likely first 
approach by the entrepreneur. To be sure, relief from the federal regulation is 
available to the small entrepreneur who raises capital only locally. The federal 
securities laws exempt offers made exclusively to the residents of the same state 
of the business’s formation and principal place of business.26 But, as will be 
seen, regulation at the state level more than fills this void, except in very limited 
offerings.
II. The World After NSMIA
Blue sky regulation has long been a punching bag for those seeking 
answers to why small enterprises face formidable challenges when raising 
capital. This is criticism for which state regulators need not, in today’s markets, 
necessarily be apologetic. An understanding of this statement begins with the 
NSMIA. That Act, in addition to preempting state authority with respect to 
SEC registered offerings of securities listed, or securities that will be listed 
on a national securities exchange, also provided that private offerings were 
preempted.27 In combination, this meant that the permitting realm of blue sky 
Proposal, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 279, 280 (2000).
24 See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 4(a)(6), 4A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6), 77d–1 (2012); see also id. § 
5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
25 Jumpstart Our Business Startups ( JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
26 These exemptions are described in 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) and its accompanying safe harbor 
rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2014).
27 See NSMIA, Pub. L. No. 104–290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012)).
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laws extended to what was left—non–registered offerings that were not made 
to accredited or sophisticated investors. The mission of the blue sky regulator 
was essentially that of protecting proverbial widows, widowers, and orphans. 
Moreover, consider that registered offerings are by larger companies, more 
seasoned than those whose capital formation must occur within the shadows 
of federal exemptions, such as the intrastate exemption, or those where the 
issuer is targeting a smaller sum than could be economically registered with the 
SEC. Smaller issuers not only present greater risks but also have less financial 
slack to withstand economic shocks, frequently depend on a single product, and 
are largely local—as seen above, their investors are neither QIBs, accredited, 
sophisticated, nor protected by multiple certification forces that surround the 
public offering. This naturally causes the blue sky regulator angst and response 
that this bottom–tier of investors need protection. This response finds salience 
in statistics that identify fraud in non–public offerings as the leading focus of 
blue sky law enforcement.28 It is therefore myopic to overlook the reality that 
offerings not preempted by NSMIA are a fertile area for fraudsters to sow their 
schemes. At the same time, small businesses exist, they need capital, and it is an 
understatement that most of their promoters are not fraudsters but businesses 
eager for capital. 
Champions of crowdfunding had reason to believe that crowdfunding could 
be the salvation for capital formation for such small businesses. There is a good 
deal of appeal to the image of empowering entrepreneurs to use the ubiquity of 
the Internet to connect entrepreneurs and small investors. This author believes 
that crowdfunding, as an idea, is quixotic. Worse, the burdens incident to 
accessing the exemption are so burdensome that it will likely become the last 
resort for legitimate enterprises to raise capital. 
The romantic image that surrounds crowdfunding is that members of the 
hardworking middle class can invest in ventures that will thrive, growing over 
time so that the crowdfunding investors will cease to be middle class. This 
warm image overlooks that, if this metamorphosis of the startup is to occur, 
it will be through several rounds of financing. Significantly, the subsequent 
rounds of financing will involve organized, sophisticated, and experienced 
investors, namely angel investors and venture capitalists, whose participation 
will necessarily mean a good deal of dilution to the earlier investors. 
Angels and early round venture capitalists have always faced this risk; 
they address the ever–present threat of dilution contractually securing rights 
that effectively make up for dilution when they believe a subsequent round 
of financing will advance everyone’s interest. In contrast, the participants in 
crowdfunding cannot be expected to be sophisticated, or to have sufficient 
investment at stake to merit professional representation, and are so dispersed 
as to encounter non–trivial costs to engage in coordinated response. Moreover, 
28 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–12–839, Securities Regulation: 
Factors that May Affect Trends in Regulation A Offerings 8 (2012) [hereinafter GAO 
Report].
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these same features likely will cause crowdfunding investors to engage in 
contractual protections before they make their investments. 
Not all the problems with crowdfunding fall on the investors. The 
crowdfunding provision demands annual reporting by the issuer, something not 
required by any other federal exemption.29 It also requires efforts to ascertain 
whether the crowdfunding investor has exceeded the ceiling that an individual 
can invest through crowdfunding offerings and imposes a liability standard for 
any material misrepresentation in connection with the offering.30 Thus, even 
when the final crowdfunding rules are adopted, we likely will find very limited 
experience on this provision, especially if small issuers can raise funds through 
other exemptions.
Regulation A provides fewer regulatory burdens than crowdfunding. 
Exercising its rulemaking authority under Section 3(b), the SEC created 
an abbreviated form of regulation in Regulation A.31 Unlike other federal 
exemptions, Regulation A offerings are not restricted to certain types of offerees 
or purchasers; hence, a Regulation A offering can be broadly and aggressively 
promoted. Furthermore, there are no resale restrictions, so the issuer does not 
experience the liquidity discount that prevails when offers are made under other 
exemptions. Nonetheless, the Government Accountability Office famously 
reported the effective demise of this exemption, persuasively suggesting its 
disuse was the function of several of factors.32 Among the culprits identified 
were that Regulation A offerings remain subject to the blue sky permitting 
authority and the so–called abbreviated disclosure nonetheless was not light 
enough to justify the costs because the exemption had a twelve–month ceiling 
of $5 million.33 The ultimate death of the traditional Regulation A was NSMIA; 
with Section 4(a)(2)–based offerings removed from the heavy hand of the Blue 
Sky regulator, the benefits of private placements overwhelmed those associated 
with Regulation A offerings.34
A recent SEC study of Regulation D offerings illuminates the significance 
of NSMIA on issuer choice.35 While Regulation D sets forth three distinct 
issuer safe harbors, only one of them, Rule 506, is based on Section 4(a)(2) 
and hence qualifies offered securities as “covered securities” for which state 
regulation is preempted.36 In broad overview, Rule 506 permits the issuer to 
29 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(b)(4) (2012).
30 Id. § 77d–1(c).
31 Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–263 (2014).
32 GAO Report, supra note 26, at 16.
33 Id. at 16–19. The burdensome review process for both SEC and state administrators under 
Regulation A is a process exacerbated by the fragmented state law standards that must be met. In 
contrast, there are procedural advantages to using Regulation D, since it is usually quicker and less 
expensive. Id.
34 See id. at 9; see also GAO Report, supra note 26, at 9.
35 Ivanov & Bauguess Study, supra note 9.
36 Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. §77r(b)(4)(E) (2012).
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sell unlimited dollar amounts of securities without registration to an unlimited 
number of accredited investors and up to thirty–five non–accredited investors.37 
Recently, exercising authority provided by the JOBS Act, the SEC declared 
that Rule 506 offerings could involve general advertisement and solicitation 
to accredited investors.38 This development adds immensely to the overall 
attractiveness of Rule 506. Indeed, Rule 506 must be seen as the giant tree 
that smothers growth of other varieties of the exemption species.39 Consider 
that the safe harbor created in Rule 506 dwarfs that of the other two safe 
harbors; 94% of Regulation D offerings by number, and 99% by dollar amount, 
occur under Rule 506.40 The significance of Rule 506 is enhanced by noting 
that the amount of new capital raised pursuant to private offerings in 2012 
totaled $1.7 trillion, compared to $1.2 trillion in new capital raised through 
registered offerings; 41 recall that in the exemption arena Rule 506 is the 
dominant exemption. Moreover, approximately two–thirds of the Regulation D 
offerings represent new equity.42 Of particular importance to this article is that 
the median amount of Regulation D offerings (recall that, by number, 94% are 
Rule 506 offerings) is $1.5 million.43 Notably, issuers routinely prefer Rule 506 
to the other Regulation D safe harbor exemptions for which they could qualify; 
for example, the offering could fall within Rule 504, which has much fewer 
qualifications than Rule 506.44 The conclusion to be drawn from this preference 
is that the state law preemption that Rule 506 offerings enjoy matters a good 
deal to issuers and contributes to how capital formation occurs in the United 
States. Equally important is that among non–financial issuers (e.g., startups 
and other small businesses) a non–accredited investor participated in only 11% 
37 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)–(c)(i) (2014).
38 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c).
39 See e.g., GAO Report, supra note 26, at 19 (identifying the lower burdens of Rule 506 as a 
cause for disuse of Regulation A).
40 Ivanov & Bauguess Study, supra note 9, at 7 & 7 fig.3.
41 Id. at 8, 9 fig.4.
42 Id. at 9, 10 fig.5, 9 tbl.2 (noting Table 2’s figure of two–thirds of 31,471 which shows that 
while public offerings of debt and even Rule 144A syndications are larger in absolute terms, most 
debt offerings involve “rolling over” existing debt so that they do not involve new infusions of funds 
into business). 
43 Id. at 4.
44 In addition to requiring each purchaser be accredited, sophisticated, or have a purchaser 
representative, Rule 506 imposes disclosure requirements to non–accredited investors, as well as 
other information requirements, such as what information has been provided accredited investors 
and restrictions on resale. Offerings pursuant to Rule 504, although limited to $1 million, are 
nonetheless conditioned on compliance with state law permits or exemptions, provided that the 
permit or exemption compels disclosure. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (2014). Such disclosure 
is not a condition for Rule 504 if the offering is pursuant to a state law exemption conditioned on 
sales being made exclusively to accredited investors. See id. § 230.504(b)(1)(iii). Rule 506 also does 
not require disclosure for sales made to accredited investors. Id. Nonetheless, it would be rare that 
an issuer would prefer Rule 504 to 506, even if sales were to be made only to accredited investors, 
since with Rule 506 the issuer has the opportunity to raise more than $1 million.
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of the offerings.45 Thus, accredited investors are the dominant providers of new 
capital for new businesses. And the number of investors in those offerings is 
quite small: the mean number of investors is eight for Regulation D offerings 
by non–financial issuers (median of four).46
So, what can we surmise from the above data? We see that a good deal of 
capital formation by small enterprises not only can occur but also does occur 
through Rule 506 and thus is outside the permitting authority of the states. 
For non–financial issuers, the average number of purchasers is quite small, 
eight, and the overwhelming percentage of the purchasers are accredited 
investors.47 Minimally, this data underscores the earlier observation that the 
wards of the Blue Sky regulator are the residual category of investors—those 
who are not QIBs, accredited, or sophisticated. They truly are a species needing 
some paternalism. Even for this group, as examined in the next section, there 
may well not be much protection due to the availability of state exemptions 
from the blue sky laws.
III. What Is the Problem with State Law Exemptions?
 Offerings that are not preempted by NSMIA may nonetheless escape 
review by the state administrator. All states provide a range of offering 
exemptions. The exemption provided by Massachusetts is representative of the 
genre across the states. Under the Massachusetts provision, no permit need be 
acquired from the state administrator if the offering within a twelve–month 
period does not exceed twenty–five persons and sales are made to no more than 
ten in–state persons.48 By way of further illustration of the contours of this 
type of exemption, Texas is fifty percent more generous than Massachusetts, as 
it allows sales to fifteen investors during a twelve–month period.49 States like 
Illinois provide an exemption for up to thirty–five purchasers, provided the 
offering is not more than $1 million.50 Massachusetts is typical of other states 
in that an exemption is conditioned on there being no general solicitation or 
advertisement.51
45 Ivanov & Bauguess Study, supra note 9, at 15 tbl. 4.
46 Id.
47 Id. (reporting that only ten percent of the Regulation D offerings by non–financial issuers 
had participation by at least one non–accredited investor).
48 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110A, § 402(b)(9) (West). Massachusetts, like many other 
states, has also adopted the so–called Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, which is designed 
to coordinate state and federal exemptions so that compliance with exemptions created in either 
Rule 505 or 506 of Regulation D would be similarly exempt from state regulation. Id. § 402(b)(9). 
An important limitation on the ULOE is the limitation on commissions to persons other than 
registered broker–dealers or their agents, as well as suitability requirements. Id. 
49 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581–5, § (I)(c) (West 2010).
50 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4(G)(1)(a) (2008).
51 See 950 Mass. Code Regs. 14.402(B)(9)(e) (2014).
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It is ironic, if not paradoxical, that the hotbed of entrepreneurism, and one 
of the most resilient economies during the financial crisis, California, is among 
the most restrictive states in the scope of its exemptions. California limits the 
exemption to thirty–five persons (including those outside of California) and 
bars general solicitation and advertisements in connection with the offering.52 
What makes this California exemption restrictive is that each of the purchasers 
either must enjoy a personal relationship with the issuer or be reasonably 
assumed to have the capacity to protect his own interest in the transaction.53 
Thus, unlike Massachusetts or Texas, the exemption does not afford a means for 
the issuer to distribute any part of its offering to the residual class of investors. 
Relaxation of this requirement, however, is available for issuers who, after the 
offering, will have only a single class of voting common stock that is owned 
beneficially by no more than thirty–five persons.54 There is a further limitation 
in connection with the offering in that the issuer cannot pay for the offering’s 
promotion.55
Superficially, the problem many small issuers must confront when raising 
funds outside the preemptive scope of NSMIA is that they cannot broadly 
canvas potential investors who are not accredited. A further practical constraint 
is that, even if they could approach a sizable number of potential offerees, the 
amount that each offeree could be expected to invest would be small. This, 
in combination with the state–imposed numerical limit on the number of 
purchases, means that the issuer will be unable to raise the funds it needs. Not 
to be overlooked in this explanation is the earlier reviewed data reflecting that 
there are very few investors on average in the small Regulation D offerings.56 
Their success therefore depends on a few of the purchasers making a substantial 
investment. This in turn is reflected in the data that shows that very few 
Regulation D offerings have non–accredited purchasers.57
Thus, enterprises seeking capital that cannot proceed through the Rule 
506, because the likely purchasers either lack a high net worth or are not 
sophisticated investors, are forced to confront the state and its exemptions. 
The state exemption, in turn, requires that sales not exceed a very small number. 
Thus, like Scylla and Charybdis, the interaction of federal and state laws lead 
to a painful reality. It is likely not possible that the issuer can raise the needed 
funds within the state–imposed numerical limit on the number of purchasers. 
This conclusion flows from the following: After all, the contemplated pool of 
offerees, and hence the pool of likely purchasers that are available the issuer 
52 Cal. Corp. Code § 25102(f )(1), (4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).
53 Id. § 25102(f )(2). Of interest is that a qualifying relationship does not necessarily include 
the employer–employee, security holder of the issuer, or customer of the issuer. Cal. Code Regs. 
tit. 10, § 260.102.12(d) (2014).
54 Cal. Corp. Code § 25102(h).
55 Id. § 25102(h)(3).
56 See Ivanov & Bauguess, supra note 9, at 4.
57 See id.
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will not have the income, wealth or sophistication of the type that qualified the 
offering under Rule 506; it is this fact that prompts the issuer to resort to an 
exemption under the state law because had the offering qualified under Rule 506 
the offering would have been exempt from state regulation. Thus, individuals 
within the pool of investors that the issuer must approach will be individuals 
of modest means. This means they can be expected to have small amounts to 
invest in the offering so that the issuer to raise the capital it desperately needs 
must approach a large number of such investors. This number can be expected 
to exceed the small number set forth in the state exemption. 
Note that the source of the issuer’s dilemma flows from it not having access 
to accredited or sophisticated investors. We do not know what enables some 
issuers to attract the interest of accredited investors that others cannot. It is 
very likely that this factor, not the narrowness of the state law exemption, 
explains which offerings slip outside the protective waters of Rule 506 and, 
therefore, face the strong winds of merit review. Simply put, the issuers that 
confront this capital formation dilemma do not know, and lack a viable means 
to connect with, accredited investors or sophisticated investors.58 Thus, these 
issuers are left with unsophisticated potential purchasers who presumably lack 
sufficient means or willingness to invest sufficient sums to enable the issuer 
to accomplish its objective within the thirty–five non–accredited purchaser 
limit. The problem is actually greater than described above. Rule 506 offerings 
are conditioned on there being no general solicitation or advertisement of the 
offering. This requirement mandates that the issuer or its representative have a 
preexisting relationship with the offeree, even though the offeree is otherwise 
sophisticated.59 A recent amendment to Rule 506 relaxes this prohibition 
when the issuer reasonably believes the approached investor is accredited.60 
Thus, a budding business may have some awareness that certain individuals are 
sophisticated and experienced investors, but not whether the individual meets 
the definition of being also accredited. As a result, issuers, who must confront 
the limited exemptions of state law, do so not just because they know only 
unsophisticated investors, but also because they lack a sufficient relationship 
with sophisticated investors to overcome the bar to general solicitations or to 
have a reasonable basis to believe they are accredited.
Crowdfunding may well be the antidote for the issuer’s inability to connect 
to accredited investors. While this exemption does have a low dollar limit 
58 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A Moderate Capital,” 
31 Del. J. Corp. L. 77, 88 (2006) (“The problems for small businesses are . . . the difficulties they 
face in identifying potential investors and the costs of connecting themselves with the investors’ 
demand.”).
59 See generally Cox, Hillman & Langevoort, supra note 17, at 291 (referencing the SEC 
no–action letter practice and emphasizing the importance of a preexisting relationship between the 
issuer (or those acting on its behalf ) and offerees).
60 SEC Eliminating Advertising Release, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act 
Release No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,771 ( July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 
239 & 242). 
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for the offering,61 there is no limit on the number of purchasers. In addition, 
crowdfunding is among the offerings that fall within the definition of covered 
securities so that state regulation is preempted.62 But as seen, crowdfunding 
has its costs, which will likely limit its practical use. However, the next section 
develops a very different approach that could prove very useful to many small 
enterprises.
IV. Capital Formation Through Intermediation
The market intermediary has long been an essential link in capital 
formation.63 Simply stated, market professionals provide professional experience 
in matching ventures and investors; their credibility with investors flows not 
from their experience but by their being repeat players so that reputation is 
a predominant feature of their continued success. To be noted here is that 
crowdfunding portals are not served in this role in the same way since they 
are foreclosed from providing a recommendation. It remains to be seen 
whether such portals will morph, as did the early exchanges, into themselves as 
reputation intermediaries by imposing demanding criteria for securities offered 
through a sponsoring portal.
The SEC’s new general solicitation provision provides some important 
assistance to small issuers. Rule 506 offerings can now include solicitations to 
accredited investors with whom the issuer or its representative does not have 
any preexisting relationship.64 There are, of course, important restrictions on 
this process with a common theme that there be a reasonable belief the solicited 
party is accredited. But the surmise above is that the challenge for small issuers, 
who in the past have sought capital outside Rule 506, is not solely that they 
lacked a preexisting relationship with accredited investors and others; they face 
an even more daunting challenge, namely that they likely are not attractive or 
attractive to  enough investors to meet their financing goal. That is, for many 
issuers, it is not the requirement of a preexisting relationship with offerees 
that forces issuers out of Rule 506 and into the state permitting process. Their 
problem is they are simply not so attractive that funds can be raised from a 
small enough group so that not only must the approach be broadly based, thus 
constituting a general solicitation that removes them from Rule 506, but also 
they must appeal to a larger number than the state law exemption permits. 
On the other hand, the data supports the view that capital formation at low 
61 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012).
62 Id. § 18(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C).
63 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. 
L. Rev. 549, 616–19 (1984) (showing investment bankers as intermediaries); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for Unregistered 
Offerings of Securities, 2 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 1, 2–3 (1998) (illustrating the use of the 
Internet as an intermediary).
64 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014).
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levels does occur and, as seen earlier, relies heavily on a small number of 
accredited investors. Thus, between 2009 and 2012, 19,424 offerings raising 
less than $1 million were made by non–fund issuers pursuant to Rule 506, and 
2702 offers were made under either Rule 504 or 505.65 Thus, about one in eight 
issuers invoking Regulation D cannot raise their capital without reaching out to 
non–accredited and non–sophisticated investors.66 For this group of issuers, the 
recent relaxation of solicitations for Rule 506 offerings will not likely change 
their fate. 
Another approach for issuers that lack appeal to accredited investors, 
or even sophisticated investors, is to invoke the services of an intermediary. 
To some extent, this practice already exists within Rule 506. Broker–dealers that 
have a stable of clients can, under Rule 506, satisfy the necessary connection 
to avoid prohibited general solicitation of, or advertisement to their existing 
clients. An SEC study found that only 13% of Regulation D offerings below 
$1 million during the study period (2009–2012) utilized the services of a broker.67 
Importantly, brokers can provide assistance beyond just connecting issuers with 
a stable of potential investors. Regulation D sets forth procedures for a broker, 
or others, to act as a purchaser representative for unsophisticated purchasers 
and thereby satisfy a central requirement of Rule 506.68 Thus, a mechanism 
exists whereby broker–dealers could become important intermediaries between 
investors and small firms seeking capital. We therefore see that Rule 506 
provides a medium by which small issuers who are isolated from investors not 
only locate and communicate their offering to investors without running afoul 
of the bar to general solicitations but also provides a means for the broker to 
address any want of sophistication on the part of any offeree. The remaining 
hurdle facing the issuer is whether investors are persuaded that the investment’s 
expected return is commensurate with the significant risk of the security offered 
for sale. 
Indeed, the risk–return calculus is likely the source of the capital hungry 
issuer’s greatest challenge. Any intermediation provided between issuer and 
investor qualifies the intermediary as a broker.69 This invites a host of regulatory 
burdens. In the context of this topic, the most significant of those duties is 
the suitability requirement. In 2010, this duty was recast and strengthened in 
65 Ivanov & Bauguess, supra note 9, at 8 tbl.2.
66 Among non–financial issuers invoking Regulation D in 2012, only 10% of the offerings 
included at least one non–accredited investor. Id. at 15 tbl. 4. 
67 Id. at 17 & 17 fig.11; Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: Will FINRA Sink in the Sea 
Change?, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 25 n.91), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294142 (collecting results of various other studies). 
68  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2014).
69 “Broker” is broadly defined. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(4) (2012) (“‘[B]roker’ means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in 
securities for the account of others.”). 
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Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 2111.70 Broadly stated, 
Rule 2111 embodies the suitability obligation of the broker as the courts, SEC, 
and FINRA have interpreted that duty over the years. Rule 2111 requires that 
the broker must first investigate whether the security is suitable for any investor.71 
Next, the broker must find that the security is suitable for his particular client.72 
Under the first prong, the broker has an affirmative due diligence obligation 
to investigate the issuer and its business. This carries forward the case law 
requirements that brokers “know their security.”73 The second requirement 
entails the traditional customer–focused factors; at its core this assessment 
focuses on the customer’s tolerance to risk given such factors as his financial 
situation, portfolio, and objectives. Thus, we can see how brokers, even though 
meeting the conditions to be a purchaser representative, nonetheless cannot 
recommend the security to the represented customer because the security is 
not suitable for the customer. Most significantly, it is difficult to believe that 
investing in a small business, and particularly one with little operating history 
and little liquidity for its shares, is appropriate for the investor who is neither 
accredited nor sophisticated. To be sure, there are third–party vendors who 
for a fee provide due diligence in connection with such offerings.74 But third 
parties do not change the inherent endowments of the investor that limit the 
range of suitable investments. Thus, the expected variance in returns are such 
that suitability standards commonly applied to brokers are unlikely to be met 
by investors whose endowments take them outside the accredited investor 
category.
To some extent, the attraction of crowdfunding is disconnecting the 
suitability determinations from the offering process. Portal operators are 
regulated, but their regulation is not focused on tailoring offerings to the 
endowments of their customers. Customers, therefore, drive the system. As a 
result, the governor on the process is not suitability but the dollar limits each 
customer may invest during a twelve–month period. However, as will be seen, 
those burdens likely are more manageable and of a lower order than the costs 
incident to crowdfunding. Among the burdens incident such intermediation 
is the suitability requirement that binds a broker not to recommend securities 
70  Self–Regulatory Organizations, Securities Act Release No. 34–63325, Exchange Act 
Release No. 62718, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,479–85 (proposed Nov. 23, 2010).
71 FINRA, Rule 2111, Fin. Industry Reg. Auth, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) (describing how 
to determine the suitability of a security for a customer). 
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595–96 (2d Cir. 1969) (“[A] salesman cannot deliberately 
ignore that which he has a duty to know and recklessly state facts about matters of which he is 
ignorant. He must analyze sales literature and must not blindly accept recommendations made 
therein.”).
74 One such vendor is CrowdCheck, which provides not only due diligence, but also extensive 
information made available to subscribers via the Internet regarding small issuers. About Us, 
CrowdCheck, http://www.crowdcheck.com/about–us (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
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whose risks are inappropriate for the customer. Interjecting the broker between 
the crowdfunding portal and the customer resurrects the suitability requirement 
and robs crowd funding of a central benefit for starving issuers.
Conclusion
More capital is raised today through exemptions than through offerings 
registered with the SEC. This development is reassuring to those who fear 
regulation is choking the flow of capital to business and has thereby stunted 
job creation. On closer analysis, the data reviewed here does not provide 
that reassurance. When judged by offering amounts, most capital formation 
through federal exemptions is by large issuers; although small issuers do raise 
small amounts through federal exemptions. Data is reassuring—each year there 
are thousands of offerings raising about $1 million that are made to a dozen or 
fewer investors. We might well expect these numbers will grow with the newly 
adopted solicitation rules that allow issuers and their representatives to troll for 
accredited investors. 
Despite reassuring data supporting utilization of Regulation D, other 
restrictions continue. While the narrowness of state exemptions are of 
significant concern, we might wonder whether focusing on them ignores 
the real problem—the suitability determination brokers must satisfy. It is 
difficult to imagine that there are very many investment opportunities in small 
businesses that a broker believes to be suitable for her non–accredited investor 
client. To be sure, that client can instruct a broker to acquire an equally risky 
stock on the Pink Sheet market without the broker having to make a suitability 
determination. This is because, absent a recommendation, the broker is not 
required to satisfy the suitability rule. But, for the reasons developed above, 
many, if not most, capital hungry small issuers appear to know too few potential 
investors and intermediation is not just desirable, but necessary. For this group 
of issuers, the suitability requirements, not state exemptions as such, drive them 
to the medium of last resort, crowdfunding, where, as others have correctly 
reported, statutory and regulatory requirements provide a daunting path to 
raising capital. 
Notwithstanding the presence of narrow state law exemptions, demanding 
suitability requirements, and a likely dysfunctional crowdfunding provision, 
we can believe that the right balance for the economy has been struck. The 
broad canvassing of accredited investors that is now permitted and the greater 
ease with which brokers are able to meet the suitability requirement for that 
class of investors provide an avenue that also skirts the demands of state 
regulation. What remains to be regulated are a subset of investors for whom 
the paternalistic protection of the securities laws, state and federal, is most 
compelling. Thus, if the innervated captain of a startup does face a regulatory 
Scylla and Charybdis, the havoc they each may visit is founded on investor 
protection and not arbitrariness on the part of the regulator.
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